EU-kommisjonens svar på ABC Nyheters spørsmål:

ABC Nyheters spørsmål til EU-kommissær Michel Barniers stab, og deres skriftlige svar 27. juli:

Les også: Icesave-saken kan utløse dramatisk bankstrid i EU.

Does the EU directive(s) on Bank Deposit Guarantee imply that the member states are obliged to cover losses in case of bank bankruptcies that exceeds the ability of the national bank deposit guarantee scheme to cover the lost deposits?

No. The Directive clearly states that banks have to finance schemes to a very large extent. Within the next decade, banks would have to contribute to schemes in order to build up an ex-ante fund of 1.5% of eligible deposits. If insufficient, a further 0.5% can be required to be paid by banks ex-post, i.e. after a failure. Further 0.5% can be borrowed from other schemes in the EU if it is necessary. Such financing should be sufficient to cover a medium-size bank failure. If this is still insufficient, schemes need to have contingency plans where to get the money from other sources. One option would be for instance that the scheme issues bonds. There may be state financing at this level, but the Directive is neutral on this and only requires that if it is chosen, EU state aid rules are complied with. Therefore, it is neither explicitly nor implicitly required but left to Member States.

In case, what risk does the Commissioner think this will pose to member states already in financial trouble?

The above funding requirements intend to avoid using taxpayers' money and would thus lift a possible burden from such countries.

In US, President Obama stated after his new financial legislation, that the US taxpayers will no more be responsible for covering the mistakes of the financial sector. Could the same be said about EU and EEA citizens?

The EU supports the 'polluter pays' principle and shares the objective that the costs of any future financial crisis should not fall disproportionately on the tax payer. The Commission's Communication on bank resolution funds published on 26 May this year sets out the Commission's thinking on how the financial sector could contribute to the cost of financing the resolution of failing banks. As indicated there, the Commission supports the establishment of ex ante resolution funds, funded by a levy on banks, to facilitate the managed failure of ailing banks, in ways which avoid contagion and allow the bank to be wound down in an orderly manner and in a timeframe which avoids the "fire sale" of assets. The Commission believes that resolution funds will be a necessary part of the toolbox of measures to be included in the new EU crisis management framework which seek to mitigate the burden on taxpayers and minimize – or better still eliminate - future reliance on taxpayer funds to bail out banks.

In contrast to the US situation, the EFTA surveillance authority (ESA) may 26^th this year stated that the state of Iceland is responsible for covering huge banking losses that the Icelandic bank guarantee scheme could not cover. This even if the Icelandic guarantee scheme was established in accordance with EU Bank deposit guarantee directive, notified to the Authority many years ago.

Please see: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/internal-market/LFN-Icesave.pdf

- Is the ESA decision a signal to all EU/EEA country about taxpayers responsibility to clean up?

It is not Commission policy to comment on or interpret ESA's decision. It concerns a particular case.

- Is this Iceland case the first legal process handling this question?

It is not possible to reply to this question in the time available.

- Is the ESA conclusion in line with the Commission's position in this area?

The Commission shares the legal analysis of the ESA regarding the interpretation of the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive in the case of Iceland. The Commission considers that in the specific case of Iceland the liability of the Icelandic State for the reimbursement due by the Icelandic Deposit Guarantee Scheme to the EU depositors stems from the defective implementation of the Directive in Iceland. The capacity of the scheme was not proportionate in relation to the size and risks posed by the Icelandic banking sector. In addition, the failure to reimburse EU depositors represented a discriminatory treatment in relation to Icelandic depositors who were fully covered and thus did not suffer any loss as a result of the bank collapse.